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Abstract 
Given the recent traumatic events in the world‟s banking industry it is important to understand 
what drives bankers to create larger and larger, often multinational, banking groups. In this paper 
we investigate whether the targets in cross-border bank M&As are materially different from those 
banks targeted in domestic M&A deals. To address this question we use a sample of over 24,000 
banks from more than 100 countries. We begin by estimating the probability that a bank will be a 
M&A target; this probability is based upon both bank specific and country specific characteristics. 
The sample also naturally includes banks that were not involved in any M&A deal, this set of 
banks acts as a control sample for the study. We then estimate a multinomial model that 
distinguishes between (i) targets in domestic operations, (ii) targets in cross-border operations and 
(iii) non-targets. The main message of the paper is that, with few exceptions, domestic and foreign 
investors target similar banks. In particular, contrary to what one might expect, bank size does not 
affect differently the probability of being a domestic or a cross-border target, but it has a positive 
and highly significant effect in both cases. What differs between national and international M&As 
are the characteristics of the countries where banks operate. On average, banking systems 
characterized by lower leverage, higher cost inefficiency and lower liquidity are more likely to be 
targets of cross-border acquisitions, while none of this characteristics affects the likelihood of 
being acquired domestically.  
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1. Introduction 
The events in the global banking industry since the summer of 2007, that have included 
widespread bank bailouts and both full and part nationalisation of many banks, should cause us to 
question the banking industry‟s desire over the past three decades to create larger and larger 
institutions, often multinationals. Their desire to merge with and to acquire other banks has 
arguably led to the creation of an increasing number of large banking groups that are clearly too 
big to fail.  However, it is possible that this creation of “too big to fail” entities is just a by-product 
of a competitive environment for corporate control rather than a deliberate policy on behalf of 
bank executives, and normally one would deem such competition as being essential for the well 
being of any corporate sector. But given recent events it is perhaps more important than ever to try 
to understand what drives Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) activity in this crucial sector of the 
global economy. 
The pre-credit crunch academic literature on bank M&A activity has already analysed many 
different aspects of this market, ranging from the determinants of a merger or acquisition, the 
effects that such deals might have on the restructured company and its markets, the role that 
advisers play and the different means by which funding is obtained for these transactions.  M&A 
activity increased substantially over the last three decades leading up to the start of the credit crisis 
in 2007.  This increase in corporate deals in this sector began in the US in the early 1980s, but only 
took off in Europe around ten years later after the EU‟s directive on financial market integration 
(Amel et al 2004, DeYoung et al 2009, Pozzolo 2009). Prior to the impact of the global credit 
crunch the consensus was that this consolidation in the banking sector had been driven by a 
combination of technological and financial innovation and the pre-credit crunch trend towards 
financial deregulation (for example, see Berger et al 1999).  
Although the majority of M&A activity in the banking sector has been domestic in nature, cross-
border deals were twice as common in the years immediately preceding the credit crunch as they 
were in the early 1990s. As the credit bubble inflated them it seems that more and more banks 
were looking overseas for partners and targets (Figure 1). Various aspects of this 
internationalisation in the banking sector have been studied in recent research. Researchers have 
analysed the nature of the expansion of cross-border banking deals, the characteristics of the 
bidding banks and the impact that these deals have had upon the subsequent performance of the 
new corporate entity.
1
 However, perhaps surprisingly, with the exception of Correa (2009) there 
has been very little research that has focused on the characteristics of the target banks in these 
                                                          
1
 See for example Berger et al (2000), Focarelli and Pozzolo (2001), Vander Vennet (2002). 
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cross-border M&As. In this paper, our main aim is to focus on this particular aspect of M&A 
activity by investigating whether the targets in cross-border bank M&As are materially different 
from those banks targeted in domestic M&A deals.
2
 Are the sorts of banks targeted in a domestic 
deal different from those targeted in a cross-border deal?  As such, our research contributes to the 
wider understanding of the pre-credit crunch drive  for consolidation in the banking industry. 
To answer these and related questions we use a sample of over 24,000 banks from more than 100 
countries between 1992 and 2006.  We begin by estimating the probability that a bank will be a 
M&A target; this probability is based upon both bank specific and country specific characteristics. 
The sample also naturally includes banks that were not involved in any M&A deal, this set of 
banks acts as a control sample for the study. We then estimate a multinomial model that 
distinguishes between (i) targets in domestic operations, (ii) targets in cross-border operations and 
(iii) non-targets.   
Our results show that banks incorporated in countries that are larger and that are supervised by a 
larger number of regulatory authorities are significantly less likely to be targets in cross-border 
operations. In addition to these two variables, there are a number of other differences between the 
characteristics of domestic and cross-border takeover targets, but none of them turns out to be 
statistically significant. The size of the banking sector, for example, has a negative effect on the 
probability that a bank is a M&A target, but such effect is statistically significant only in the case 
of domestic operations. Similarly, bank specific characteristics such as profitability, specialization 
and cost-efficiency have in general very similar effects in the case of domestic and cross-border 
deals. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: in Section 2 we briefly review the empirical literature 
on bank mergers and acquisitions that is relevant for work here; in Section 3 we describe the data 
set, while in Section 4 we present the empirical specification of the model used in our estimation, 
in Section 5 we present our results, and we conclude the paper in Section 6 with final thoughts and 
suggestions for future research in this area.   
2.  Relevant literature  
The empirical literature that has focused on the characteristics of banks that have been involved in 
M&A activity has come to the general conclusion that more „efficient‟ banks tend to buy smaller, 
less efficient ones (DeYoung et al 2009). These less efficient targets tend to have poor capital 
ratios (Wheelcok and Wilson 2000), lower levels of profitability (Akhibe et al 2004) and a lower 
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 There is a related literature on the characteristics of targets in the manufacturing sector; for example see 
Palepu (1986) and Shleifer and Vishny (2003). 
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level of efficiency (Pasiouras et al 2007).
3
 As a result, the pre-2007 empirical evidence appeared to 
suggest that this M&A activity tended to improve the efficiency of target banks, and therefore also 
tended to have a positive effect on shareholder value overall, although this is more evident in 
European-based M&A deals.
4
 
With regard to cross-border M&A activity the available empirical evidence reveals a number of 
stylised facts. First, banks are more likely to target overseas banks where the links between the 
relevant countries are stronger, both in economic, cultural and institutional terms (see for example, 
Buch and DeLong 2004, Claessens and Van Horen 2007, or Focarelli and Pozzolo 2008). Second, 
the targets in these cross-border deals are more likely to be located in countries with higher 
expected growth (see Focarelli and Pozzolo 2005). And finally, the presence of specific 
regulations and the degree of concentration in the banking sector have significant but unclear 
effects on the pattern of these cross-border expansions (see for example, Hernando et al. 2008, 
Correa 2009, Pasiouras et al 2007,  Focarelli and Pozzolo 2005, or Hannan and Pilloff 2006). 
Correa (2009), which represents the only study to our knowledge that compares domestic and 
cross-border targets in bank M&A operations, finds that banks that are acquired by foreign 
investors tend to be larger and have poorer performance than those acquired by domestic 
institutions. However, the empirical analysis might be compromised because the control sample 
used in the study only includes banks that were either domestic or cross-border M&A target over 
the sample period. 
More broadly, our work is related to the role of economic borders on cross-border banking 
activities. On the one hand, as suggested by Carbò Valverde et al (2009), the informational 
asymmetries that make it more difficult to organize cross-border M&As may be one of the reasons 
at the root of the policy pursued by many European banks, in many cases encouraged by national 
authorities, of creating large “national champions”. This can be seen as a defensive policy, since 
large domestic banks might be less likely to be targets in cross-border M&As. However, as 
suggested by Degryse et al (2009), once domestic banks increase their size and focus on larger and 
more transparent borrowers, they might become more transparent and therefore be more easy 
targets also in cross-border M&As, as some recent experiences such as the acquisition of the 
German HVB by the Italian Unicredit or of the UK Abbey National by the Spanish Santander have 
shown. 
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 For research relating to the characteristics of these targets see Focarelli et al. (2003), Hernando et al. 
(2008), Correa (2009), Lanine and Vander Vennet (2007). 
4
 See for example Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) and Campa and Hernando (2006). 
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3.  Data and summary statistics 
In this paper we attempt to identify whether banks targeted by other domestic banks are materially 
different from those that are targeted by overseas banks.  To this end we make use of a substantial 
data set. The initial sample of data includes all those bank mergers and acquisitions that were 
announced and completed between 1988 and 2006 and that have a record in the Platinum 
Worldwide Mergers and Acquisition Database, which is a commercial database provided by 
Security Data Corporation (SDC). Each record includes information about the name, main sector 
of operation and country of residence of the bidder and of the target, several identification codes 
(such as ISIN and SEDOL), the announced and effective dates of the deal, and details about the 
deal status. In our sample, we only include completed M&As and we take as our reference the 
effective date of realisation. We define domestic M&As as those where the nationalities of the 
bidder and of the target banks are identical; we define cross-border M&As as those where they 
differ.
5
 Our initial data set comprises over 19,000 deals. We obtained bank balance sheet data from 
Bankscope, which is a commercial database provided by Bureau van Dijk.  We then merged the 
M&A data set from SDC with the balance sheet information from Bankscope using company 
SEDOL code, which is the only identifier common to the two databases. Having done this our data 
set comprised 185,962 observations on 24,325 banks between 1992 and 2006, which involved in 
1,474 M&A deals, of which 1,176 were domestic and 298 cross-border. The incidence of domestic 
deals is nearly four times that of operations involving banks from different countries, confirming 
once again that national borders matter. We gathered data on GDP and the ratio of private credit to 
GDP for each country from the IMF World Economic Outlook database and from the World Bank 
database, respectively. Further, following the literature on the determinants of M&As, we include 
in our analysis two key indices of the institutional characteristics of a country: the extent of 
disclosure of corporate decisions and the strength of legal rights, which measures the degree to 
which collateral and bankruptcy laws protect the rights of borrowers and lenders and thus facilitate 
lending.
6
 Both indices are produced within the Doing Business Project by the International 
Finance Corporation, a corporation part of the World Bank.
7
 Finally, data on the number of bank 
supervisors is from Barth et al (2001), updated to 2008. 
Table 1 shows a full summary of the deals that comprise our database by country.  Domestic deals 
are widespread over our sample. The highest number of domestic operations over this sample 
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 As is typical for research in this area, we do not distinguish between mergers and acquisitions. 
6
 The extent of disclosure is one of the three components of the index of investor protection used by Rossi 
and Volpin (2004); in unreported analyses available upon request we verified that this component is the only 
one with a robust and significant effect in our framework. 
7
 See http://www.doingbusiness.org/Downloads/. 
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period were seen in USA, where 337 deals were completed representing 29% of the domestic deal 
sample (shown in column 3 of Table 1). There were also a large number of deals in Italy and 
Japan, 138 and 123 respectively. In total, targets located in G10 countries accounted for nearly 
70% of all the domestic deals in our sample.
8
 German targets represented a significant proportion 
of our sample of cross-border deals, 17 in total representing 6% of the total of cross-border deals. 
Banks from Italy (14), Brazil (13) and France (13) were also frequent targets in cross-border M&A 
transactions. In total, targets located across G10 countries accounted for nearly one quarter of all 
cross-border deals. The relative higher incidence of domestic as opposed to cross-border M&As 
signals that banks in larger countries are, all else equal, less likely to be acquired by foreign 
investors. 
Figure 1 plots the number of both domestic and cross-border bank M&A deals on an annual basis 
from 1992 to 2006. Clearly, domestic operations are much more frequent than cross-border deals, 
a fact well known in the empirical literature (see, e.g., Focarelli and Pozzolo, 2001). Both 
domestic and cross-border deals are evenly distributed across our sample period with slightly more 
than half of the deals being completed before 2000, both for domestic and cross-border operations. 
Both types of deal peaked before the collapse in the stock market in 2001, before recovering again 
as the equity markets recovered too.
9
 
In Table 2 we present some descriptive statistics for the data used in the empirical analysis. The 
average value of total GDP is $236 billion, expressed in purchasing power parity terms. The 
smallest value in our sample is for Albania  ($4.18 billion) and the largest, naturally, for the USA 
($10,235 billion). Private sector credit expressed as a proportion of GDP is very high for a number 
of countries including many of those that have since suffered severely from the effects of the credit 
crunch. The average of this variable for the G10 countries is just above unity. The data on bank 
concentration were calculated by summing the market share of the five largest banks in each 
country. The average level of concentration, according to this measure, is 67%; Sweden is highly 
concentrated, with an index of 95% while Luxemburg (23%) and USA have the lowest 
concentration (25%). The average value for the G10 countries is 56%. The number of authorities 
responsible for bank supervision does not change with the development of the financial markets. 
More than one authority is present in less developed countries (e.g., Malaysia) as well as among 
the G10s (USA). The Extent of disclosure index, that measures investor protection considering the 
degree of disclosure of corporate decisions to third parties, ranges from 0 in countries such as Laos 
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 G10 countries are Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom, United States. Our sample does not include operations with Canadian target banks.  
9
 Pozzolo (2009) analyses more in detail the patterns of bank M&As providing some explanations of the 
drop registered at the beginning of the decade. 
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and Sudan, to 10 in France and UK, but also in Malaysia and Thailand. It is 7 in USA. Finally, the 
Strength of legal rights index, that measures the degree to which laws protect the rights of 
borrowers and lenders, ranges from 1 in countries such as Bolivia and Syria, to 10 in Malaysia and 
Singapore. It is 9 in UK and 8 in USA. 
Table 3 reports summary statistics for the individual banks in our sample. Panel A provides 
average values for the indicators for those banks that were not involved in M&As, while Panels B 
and C provide the same information for those involved in domestic and cross-border M&As 
respectively. Summary statistics are calculated for the sample of banks in each category in the year 
before the M&A event took place. In other words, each bank contributes to the average value of 
total assets of domestic targets with its asset value in the year before it has merged or has been 
acquired. Bank summary statistics are calculated by excluding values larger than the 99
th
 or 
smaller than the 1
st
 percentile. 
Perhaps surprisingly, targets in cross-border and domestic M&As are larger on average than those 
banks that have not been involved in any M&A deal. The average and median total assets of 
targets not involved in M&A activity are $1,920 million and $260 million respectively (panel A); 
for those banks involved in domestic M&As they are, respectively, $5,207 million and $942 
million (panel B); and for cross-border deals the numbers are respectively $4,193 million and 
$1,143 million (panel C). The findings of Akhige et al. (2003) that targets are less profitable than 
average is also confirmed in the case of cross-border M&As. The return on assets is higher for the 
set of cross-border target banks than for the domestic banks and very similar to the return on assets 
achieved by those banks not involved in M&A activity over this period. Also interest margin is 
higher for cross-border targets (4.3%), and it is lower for non targets (3.8%) and domestic targets 
(3.6%). On average cross-border and non targets have the same share of revenues coming from 
non traditional banking activities (13%), as opposed to 12% for domestic targets. Banks that have 
not been targets have higher capitalization (11.3%) than those of domestic operations (9.8%); 
while cross-border targets have an intermediate level (10.9%). Both domestic and cross-border 
targets are on average less cost efficient: the cost to income ratio of target banks it respectively 
71.6% and 68.6% for those involved in domestic and cross-border deals, higher than for those not 
involved in M&A over this period (67.3%). Finally, the ratio of liquid to total assets is higher for 
target banks, more so for those involved in cross-border (23.9%) than domestic deals (20.2%).  
4.  The Empirical model 
In Section 3 we presented descriptive statistics that showed that there appeared to be differences in 
the characteristics of banks that have not been involved in any M&A deal, and those that have 
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been involved in either a domestic or a cross-border deal. Further, some differences emerged 
between domestic and cross-border targets. We now approach this issue in a more formal context 
by specifying a model to test the null hypothesis that the two sets of targets have the same 
characteristics. We conduct this analysis in two stages.  We begin by using a binomial model to 
estimate the probability that a bank is an M&A target.  The binomial model specification that we 
estimate is shown as follows: 
  
 Pr(Yijt = 1) = F(Xijt-1, Cjt-1, TDt) (1) 
 
where Yijt takes the value of one if bank i from country j at time t is involved in an M&A and zero 
otherwise; Xit-1 is a set of bank specific characteristics at time t-1, expressed as differences from 
year and country averages;
10
 Cjt represents a set of country specific characteristics; and TDt are a 
set of time dummies. Since some of the explanatory variables only vary at the country level, our 
estimates might be affected by the aggregate regressor problem, i.e. by possible within-class 
disturbance correlation (Moulton, 1990). For this reason, the standard errors are clustered at the 
country level. 
We then estimate a multinomial model that distinguishes between (i) targets in domestic 
operations, (ii) targets in cross-border operations and (iii) non-targets. Employing the same set of 
explanatory variables used to estimate expression (1), we therefore estimate: 
 
 Pr(Yijt = k) = F(Xit-1, Cjt-1, TDt) k = 0, 1, 2 (2) 
 
where Yijt = 0 if bank i of country j at time t is not a target; Yijt = 1 if it is a target in a domestic 
M&A; and Yijt = 2 if it is a bidder in a cross-border M&A.  
While the binomial specification could be estimated either using logit or probit, multinomial 
choice models estimated using a logistic specification impose the independence of irrelevant 
alternative hypothesis, that is rejected in our sample. For this reason we estimate both models 
using a probit specification. 
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 We chose this specification since we did not want to include country fixed effects because this would have 
made impossible to estimate the between-countries effects of country characteristics and, at the same time, 
we wanted to account separately for the effect of average characteristics of banks in each country and for the 
impact of bank individual characteristics. Besides, in most cases, maximization of the likelihood function for 
multinomial probit estimates including country fixed effects did not reach converge. 
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5.  Empirical results 
Baseline specification 
Table 4 presents the results of the estimates of the baseline specification. The columns headed (1) 
and (2) in Table 4 respectively report the coefficients and the marginal effects (multiplied by 
10,000) evaluated at the sample median of the binomial specification of the model in expression 
(1). The columns headed (3) to (6) report instead the coefficients and the marginal effects of the 
multinomial specification of the model in expression (2). Column (7) shows the statistical 
significance of the test for the difference in the coefficients for domestic and cross-border M&As 
in the multinomial specification. As already mentioned above, in all specifications, individual 
bank-specific characteristics are expressed as differences from year and country means. In each 
column, Panel A reports the results for general country-specific characteristics, Panel B shows the 
results for year and country averages of bank characteristics, and Panel C for the individual bank 
levels, expressed as differences from year and country averages. 
Binomial choice model 
Column (1) of Panel A shows that banks operating in countries with more developed credit 
markets (a higher credit to GDP ratio), higher bank concentration, a larger number of supervisors 
of banking activities, represented by the dummy variable “multiple sup”, and where collateral and 
bankruptcy laws provide a stronger protection of the rights of borrowers and lenders (Strength of 
legal rights) are less likely to be M&A targets. The coefficients on the size of the economy (total 
GDP) and the transparency of related-party transactions, a key measure of investor protection, are 
instead statistically insignificant. 
Next, in Panel B of Table 4, we consider the effect of year and country averages of bank-specific 
characteristics. Column (1) shows that banks are more likely to be M&A targets in countries where 
the average size of credit institutions is larger and where cost efficiency is lower. None of the other 
characteristics is statistically significant. 
Finally, in Panel C of Column (1) we report the coefficients of the bank specific characteristics. 
M&A targets are larger than non-targets, as confirmed by the positive and highly significant 
coefficient on Total assets. Recall that we calculated all bank specific variables as differences with 
respect to year and country means, and these results show therefore that targets are on average 
larger than their country peers. Furthermore, they are less profitable and less innovative, as shown 
by the negative and significant coefficients on Returns on assets and on the share of Other 
operative income over total income (a standard measure of the incidence of more non-traditional 
banking activities). And finally, they are less cost efficient, as shown by the positive coefficient of 
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the Cost to income ratio. By contrast, net interest margins and capitalization seem to have little 
impact on the likelihood of being a target or not. Overall, these results provide additional support 
for the results of previous research on bank M&As (see, e.g., Akhigbe et al., 2003) and on bank 
internationalisation based on country level characteristics (see, for example, Focarelli and Pozzolo 
2005), showing that target banks are typically more traditional and less profitable and efficient 
than average.  
Column (2) presents the marginal effects of each explanatory variable, evaluated at the sample 
median and multiplied by 10,000. The two variables with the largest influence are the individual 
bank share of other operative income over total income and the number of authorities involved in 
supervision. The marginal effects of size and profitability are smaller than that of specialisation, 
and that of cost efficiency is negligible. 
Multinomial choice model 
As argued above, cross-border deals are far less frequent than domestic deals, suggesting that 
investors may see them as different types of operations, organized possibly for very different 
purposes.
11
 It is therefore not obvious why domestic and foreign investors would choose to buy or 
merge with the same types of banks. To test this hypothesis we have then estimated the 
multinomial choice model of expression (2).  The results are presented in Columns (3) to (6). The 
most noticeable finding is that only four coefficients are significantly different between domestic 
and cross-border targets; and three of them represent country level characteristics. Specifically, 
banks incorporated in countries that are smaller are significantly less likely to be targets in cross-
border operations, while the size of the country has no significant effect in the case of domestic 
operations. The presence of multiple bank supervisors has a negative effect on the probability that 
a bank is a target in both domestic and cross-border deals, but such effect is much larger in the 
latter case. Banks operating on countries with a higher average share of revenues coming from 
non-traditional banking activities are also significantly less likely to be targets in cross-border 
M&As. But although the sign of the coefficient of other operative income over total income is 
positive in the case of domestic deals and negative in the case of international operations, none of 
them is statistically significant per se. Finally, less profitable banks are more likely to be targets in 
domestic operations, but this is not the case for cross-border operations. In other words, investors 
at home buy banks that are relatively less profitable on average, while this result is not robust for 
investors from abroad.  
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et al (2010) show that bank international diversification augments corporate value. 
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In addition to the previous four characteristics, some additional features differ between targets of 
domestic and cross-border takeovers, although they do not turn out to be statistically significant. 
The index for Strength of legal rights in protecting borrowers and lenders has a negative and 
statistically significant effect in the case of domestic M&As, but not for cross-border deals. 
Countries in which banks are on average more capitalized and less liquid are more likely to host 
cross-border M&A targets, but these country characteristics have no statistically significant impact 
on the likelihood of domestic operations. Among bank specific variables, in addition to the 
different effect of profitability, we find that bank specialisation towards less traditional activities, 
proxied by the share of other operative income over total income, has a negative effect on the 
probability that it is a target in a domestic M&A, but no statistically significant impact in the case 
of cross-border deals, although the sign and the magnitude of the coefficients are comparable. 
Finally, and most remarkably, it is confirmed that larger and less cost efficient banks are more 
likely to be targets in both domestic and cross-border M&As. 
In synthesis, these results show that domestic and foreign investors target similar banks, and what 
differs mostly between national and international M&As are the characteristics of the countries 
where banks operate, and the average country characteristics of each banking system. Most 
interestingly, and contrary to what one might expect, size has a positive and highly significant 
effect on the probability that a bank is a domestic as well as a cross-border target, shedding some 
doubts on the hypothesis that the “national champions” policy succeeded in limiting foreign entry. 
In the following, we will verify if and how the results of the baseline specification change when 
we consider different samples of banks and countries. 
Alternative specifications 
Tables 5 to 9 have the same structure of Table 4, but present the results obtained using different 
specifications with respect to the baseline model. In particular, we focus on larger banks, banks in 
developed (G10) and less developed countries, and banks in economically integrated areas (EU15 
and EMU).
12
 
Large banks 
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 present the coefficients and the marginal effects obtained from the 
estimates of expression (1), but where the smaller banks (defined as those with total assets below 
our sample median of slightly more than 25 billions of US$) have been excluded, thereby reducing 
the number of observations from 136,183 to 68,335. The overall results are qualitatively 
unchanged, although some coefficients have different significance. In particular two previously 
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statistically significant coefficients on country specific characteristics (Bank concentration and  the 
dummy for multiple supervisors) and two on individual bank characteristics (Return of asses and 
Cost to income ratio) become statistically insignificant, and one bank specific coefficient becomes 
significant (liquid assets over total deposits). They all maintain the same sign and a similar 
magnitudes. Also the marginal effects (column (2)) show little changes with respect to the baseline 
specification. 
Also the results of the multinomial model, reported in columns (3) to (6), broadly confirm those of 
the baseline specification. For three of the four variables that had a significantly different effect on 
domestic and cross-border targets in the baseline specification – GDP, the dummy for multiple 
supervisors and the average ratio of other operative income to total income – we obtain the same 
result also in the subsample of larger banks. In addition, in the sample of larger banks also the 
coefficients for the individual ratio of bank equity over total assets (the inverse of leverage) are 
significantly different from each other, although only that for cross-border M&As is positive and 
statistically significant, suggesting that more capitalized banks are less likely to be acquired by 
foreign investors. On the contrary, the coefficients on individual bank profitability, that 
significantly differed in the baseline specification, are both statistically insignificant, as well as 
their difference. 
Finally, Column (3) shows that the negative coefficients of Other operative income over total 
income and of liquidity in the binomial specification are entirely explained by domestic deals, 
suggesting that bidders are less likely to acquire a foreign bank with the intent to innovate its 
activities or to inject liquidity. 
G10 and non-G10 countries 
In Table 6 we present results for the sub-sample of banks in the G10 countries. With respect to the 
baseline specification, the number of observations slightly drops to 122,215. In the binomial 
specification the results change in many respects (Column (1)). First, the coefficients of Private 
credit over GDP and of bank concentration become smaller and statistically insignificant. Second, 
the coefficient on the index for the Extent of disclosure becomes positive and statistically 
significant. Third, the coefficient on average bank capitalization in the country (Equity over total 
assets) becomes negative and statistically significant. And fourth, the coefficient of average Other 
operative income over total income, our measure of banks specialization, becomes statistically 
significant, while that at the individual bank level becomes insignificant.  
In the multinomial specification (Columns (3) and (4)), the coefficients differ between domestic 
and cross-border M&As in six cases, and none of them coincides with those of the baseline 
specification. Among general country characteristics, the indexes of the institutional characteristics 
13 
 
in corporate activities have a statistically significant effect only on the probability that a bank is a 
target in a domestic deal, and the difference with respect to the effect on cross-border deals is also 
statistically significant (Panel A). Similarly, the average size and capitalization of the banks in 
each country only have a significant effect in the case of domestic deals, and the difference with 
respect to the coefficient for cross-border deals is also statistically significant (Panel B). The effect 
of individual bank innovativeness, proxied by the share of other income over total income, is 
significantly different from zero for both domestic and cross-border M&As, but it has a negative 
impact on domestic operations and a positive impact on international deals, although none of the 
two coefficients is individually significant (Panel C). Finally, less liquid banks in the G10s have a 
lower probability of being targets in domestic operations, and a higher probability in the case of 
foreign acquisitions, suggesting that foreign investors might be interested in acquiring foreign 
intermediaries to inject them liquidity. 
The picture is different when we consider non-G10 countries. The results in column (1) of Table 7 
shows that banks are more likely to be M&A targets in countries with lower bank concentration 
and fewer bank supervisors (Panel A), and where on average credit institutions are larger, are more 
profitable in the traditional banking activities (i.e., have a higher Net interest margin) and are less 
liquid (Panel B). Among individual bank characteristics, targets in non G10 countries are typically 
larger, have a higher profitability from traditional activities and a lower incidence of revenues 
from innovative activities, and they are less cost efficient. In other words, large, traditional and 
low efficient banks are more likely to be targets (Panel C). 
The multinomial specification (Columns 3 and 4) shows that country size has a significantly 
different effect on the probability that a bank is a target in a domestic and in a cross-border M&A 
(Panel A).
13
 The difference between the two coefficients is statistically significant, although none 
of them is individually so. Moreover, the size of the credit market has a negative effect on the 
probability that a bank is a target in a cross-border deal, suggesting that foreign investors prefer to 
enter less financially developed countries, possibly to export their superior skills, consistent with 
Focarelli and Pozzolo (2005). It has no effects on domestic deals. The results in Panel B show that 
banks operating in countries where on average Net interest margins are higher are more likely to 
be domestic targets. Low average cost efficiency has instead a significant impact only on the 
probability of being a foreign target. At the individual bank level (Panel C), a higher Net interest 
margin increases the probability of being a domestic target, stronger specialization towards more 
innovative banking activities increases the probability of being a cross-border target, and cost 
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 In the multinomial specification it was not possible to include the dummy for multiple supervisors because 
our sample does not include instances in which the target bank in a cross-border deal is hosted in a non-G10 
country where multiple authorities are responsible for bank supervision. 
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efficiency has a similar impact on the probability of being acquired by either domestic or foreign 
investors.  
EU15 countries 
In Tables 8 and 9 we focus on a subset of countries with stronger economic, financial and 
institutional integration: The European Union before the recent enlargement (EU15) and the 
European Monetary Union (EMU). In the case of EU15 countries, the results of the binomial 
specification model, reported in Columns (1) and (2), show that targets are less likely to be located 
in countries that are large, have more developed banking markets and have a stronger protection of 
legal rights (Panel A). Among average bank characteristics, only liquidity has a statistically 
significant effect, reducing the probability that a bank is an M&A target (Panel C). With respect to 
individual bank characteristics (Panel C), consistent with previous results, we find that targets are 
larger, less cost efficient and less liquid. Moreover, within the EU15, they are also more 
capitalized, as shown by the positive sign of the coefficient on Equity over total assets. 
The multinomial specification shows a large number of general country characteristics that have a 
significantly different effect in the case of domestic and cross-border deals (Column (3), (4) and 
(7)).
14
 Banks in larger countries are less likely to be targets in a domestic deal, while the effect is 
not statistically significant in the case of cross-border deals (Panel A). Moreover, although none of 
the two coefficients is individually significant, banks in countries with a more developed credit 
market are more likely to be targets in a domestic deal and less likely in a cross-border deal, and 
the difference is statistically significant. A higher index of the Extent of disclosure also reduces the 
likelihood that banks are targets in cross-border deals, although it has no significant effect in the 
case of domestic operations. On the contrary, the strength of legal rights has a negative effect on 
the probability of being a target in a domestic deal, but has no effects in the case of cross-border 
deals.  
Average bank characteristics also have significantly different effects (Panel B). Average bank size 
and average cost efficiency only matter in the case of domestic deals, increasing the probability 
that a bank is a target. On the contrary, average specialization towards more innovative banking 
activities only affects the probability that a bank is a target in a cross-border operation, reducing its 
likelihood. Moreover, average profitability in traditional lending activities (Net interest margin) 
and average capitalization have an opposite effect on domestic and international operations. Banks 
in countries with higher average profitability in traditional activities and lower a equity to capital 
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 As in the case of the G10s, it was not possible to include in the multinomial specification the dummy for 
multiple supervisors. 
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ratio are significantly more likely to be domestic targets, and significantly less likely to be cross-
border targets. 
Finally, apart from size, that affects equally domestic and cross-border deals, all the other 
individual bank characteristics only impact on the probability that a bank is a target in a domestic 
deal, although only in the case of cost efficiency the coefficients are significantly different in the 
two cases (Panel C). In particular, more capitalized, less cost efficient and less liquid banks are 
more likely to be domestic targets. 
EMU countries 
In Table 9 we consider the case of banks operating in a very integrated area, such as the European 
Monetary Union. In the binomial specification (Column 1) only four explanatory variables turn out 
to have a statistically significant effect. In addition to credit market development, that reduces the 
probability of being an M&A target (Panel A), the other three are all individual bank 
characteristics – size, equity to total assets and cost to income – with a positive effect on the 
probability (Panel C). 
What is more striking is that in many cases country and bank characteristics have a significantly 
different effect on the probability that a bank is a target in a domestic or in a cross-border 
operation (Columns (3), (4) and (7)). General country characteristics are only relevant in the case 
of cross-border deals, with banks located in larger countries, with less developed credit markets 
and higher banks concentration being more likely to be targets of foreign investors (Panel A). Not 
surprisingly, within a strongly integrated area, institutional characteristics such as the extent of 
disclosure of corporate decisions and the strength of legal rights have no significant effects. 
With the exception of the share of income from non-lending activities, that has a negative effect on 
the probability of being both a domestic and a cross-border a target, all other average bank 
characteristics only impact on international deals (Panel B). Countries that on average have larger, 
more cost efficient, more liquid and more profitable banks in the traditional lending activities are 
significantly less likely to be targets of cross-border M&As. This results are not surprising, since 
these characteristics describe healthy banking sectors, that are more capable of defending 
themselves from foreign acquisitions. 
Finally, among individual bank characteristics, larger size, higher capitalization, lower 
specialization in innovative banking activities and lower liquidity increase the probability of being 
acquired by a domestic investor (Panel C). Larger size and lower cost efficiency increase that of 
being a cross-border target. 
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6.  Summary 
In this paper we have provided more insight into global bank mergers and acquisitions. The 
probability that a bank is the target of a cross-border M&As is on average much smaller than that 
it is the target in a domestic operation, which confirms that borders have a relevant impact on 
corporate activities. However, we find that, with few exceptions, domestic and foreign investors 
target fairly similar banks. What differs between national and international M&As are the 
characteristics of the countries where banks operate. Banks incorporated in countries that are 
smaller and where a fewer number of authorities is in charge of bank supervision are significantly 
more likely to be targets in cross-border operations. Within the more heterogeneous subset of the 
non-G10 countries, we also find that foreign investors prefer to acquire banks in countries where 
the extent of disclosure of corporate operations is higher and where the strength of legal rights, 
which measures the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws protect the rights of borrowers 
and lenders and thus facilitate lending, is lower. 
On average, banking systems characterized by lower leverage, higher cost inefficiency and lower 
liquidity are more likely to be targets of cross-border acquisitions, while none of this 
characteristics affects the likelihood of being acquired domestically. However, the picture is 
different in the case of acquisitions within EU15 and EMU, where countries that are most 
frequently targets of cross-border deals have also lower Net interest margins and a larger share of 
income from traditional lending activities. 
As for bank specific characteristics, contrary to what one might expect, bank size does not affect 
differently the probability of being a domestic or a cross-border target, but it has a positive and 
highly significant effect in both cases.  
Overall, these results make perfect sense. First, they are not too dissimilar form those of the 
manufacturing sector, where country specific characteristics also have a significant effect on the 
probability that a firm is a target in a domestic or in a cross-border deal.
15
 Second, they confirm the 
trend amongst banks to create larger and larger financial institutions over the last two to three 
decades. Other things equal, large banks in large countries are those that have been more often 
targets of cross-border bank deals. 
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 Erel et al (2009), for example, find evidence that currency depreciation and stock market returns play an 
important role in determining the fur‟s choices, and Rossi and Volpin (2004) show that shareholder 
protection and the transparency of accounting standards in the host country affect the probability that a firm 
is a target in a cross-border M&A. In unreported specifications we verified that these variables have no 
significant effects in the case of bank M&As. 
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Figure 1 
Domestic an cross border deals par years 
This graph reports the number of domestic and cross borders deals per year in our sample. Data are from the Platinum 
Worldwide Mergers and Acquisition Database of the Security Data Corporation (SDC). 
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Table 1 
Number of Domestic and Cross border M&As by country 
This table presents the number of domestic and cross border deals for each country from 1991-2006. Data are from Platinum 
Worldwide Mergers and Acquisition Database of the Security Data Corporation (SDC). 
  Domestic Cross border Total 
Albania 1 3 4 
Argentina 23 12 35 
Armenia 0 2 2 
Australia 20 5 25 
Austria 13 4 17 
Bahrain 1 1 2 
Belarus 0 1 1 
Belgium 12 8 20 
Bermuda 2 0 2 
Bhutan 1 0 1 
Bolivia 0 3 3 
Botswana 1 0 1 
Brazil 26 13 39 
Bulgaria 3 8 11 
Cameroon 0 2 2 
Chile 10 5 15 
Colombia 8 6 14 
Croatia 1 7 8 
Czech Republic 2 4 6 
Denmark 10 1 11 
Ecuador 3 0 3 
Egypt 1 5 6 
El Salvador 0 3 3 
Estonia 4 2 6 
Fiji 0 1 1 
Finland 0 3 3 
France 50 13 63 
Germany 88 17 105 
Greece 10 3 13 
Guatemala 1 0 1 
Honduras 1 0 1 
Hong Kong 5 6 11 
Hungary 7 10 17 
Iceland 2 0 2 
India 12 5 17 
Indonesia 3 8 11 
Iraq 0 1 1 
Israel 1 0 1 
Italy 138 14 152 
Japan 123 0 123 
Jordan 1 1 2 
Kazakhstan 1 1 2 
Kenya 1 2 3 
Kuwait 1 0 1 
Kyrgyzstan 0 1 1 
Latvia 2 4 6 
Lebanon 7 1 8 
Lithuania 2 1 3 
Luxembourg 6 6 12 
Malawi 1 0 1 
Malaysia 6 0 6 
Mali 1 0 1 
Malta 0 2 2 
Mexico 7 2 9 
Morocco 4 5 9 
Mozambique 0 3 3 
Namibia 1 1 2 
Netherlands 2 2 4 
New Zealand 2 0 2 
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Table 1 (continued) 
    Domestic Cross border Total 
Nicaragua 2 0 2 
Nigeria 2 0 2 
Norway 5 4 9 
Oman 3 1 4 
Pakistan 0 3 3 
Panama 4 1 5 
Paraguay 0 1 1 
Peru 5 4 9 
Philippines 12 5 17 
Poland 19 9 28 
Portugal 16 7 23 
Romania 1 4 5 
Saudi Arabia 2 0 2 
Singapore 5 1 6 
Slovenia 6 3 9 
South Africa 1 0 1 
Spain 40 9 49 
Sri Lanka 4 0 4 
Sudan 1 0 1 
Sweden 4 0 4 
Switzerland 33 7 40 
Tanzania 1 0 1 
Thailand 7 6 13 
Tunisia 1 1 2 
Turkey 9 1 10 
Uganda 1 2 3 
Ukraine 1 6 7 
United Kingdom 13 5 18 
Uruguay 4 0 4 
USA 337 4 341 
Venezuela 5 4 9 
Vietnam 4 2 6 
1,176 298 1,474 
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Table 2 
Summary Statistics for Country-specific Variables 
This table presents the mean value of country-variables entered in the regressions. GDP is the Gross Domestic Product based on purchasing-power parity 
(PPP) expressed in billions of dollars. Private Credit to GDP is the ratio between the total amount of credits supplied and GDP. Concentration is the market 
share of the five largest banks. Multiple supervisory authority is a dummy that takes the value of one if more than one authority is responsible for bank 
supervision. Extent of disclosure index measures investor protection measured considering disclosure to third party. The index ranges from 0 to 10, with 
larger values indicating greater information. Strength of legal rights index measures the degree to which laws protect the rights of borrowers and lenders. 
The index ranges from 0 to 10, with higher scores indicating better protection. Data on GDP and Private Credits are from the World Bank database. Bank 
concentration, measured as the market share of the five largest banks (C5), is based on our elaboration from Bankscope. Multiple supervisory authority is 
from Barth et al (2001), updated to 2008. The Extent of disclosure index is from Djankov et al. (2008). The Strength of legal rights is from Djankov et al. 
(2007). 
 
Country GDP Private credit Concentration Multiple superv. Extent disclosure Strength of legal 
  
 
to GDP   authority index right 
Albania 4.18 0.08 0.80 . 8 9 
Algeria 59.02 0.08 0.86 0 6 3 
Argentina 263.93 0.18 0.37 0 6 4 
Armenia 2.62 0.07 0.79 0 5 6 
Australia 368.57 0.79 0.67 0 8 9 
Austria 189.38 1.02 0.68 0 3 7 
Azerbaijan 6.67 . 0.85 . 7 8 
Bahamas 5.41 . . . 2 9 
Bahrain 7.98 0.44 0.83 0 8 4 
Bangladesh 48.90 0.26 0.53 0 6 7 
Barbados 2.34 0.52 0.99 . . . 
Belarus 11.14 . 0.80 0 5 2 
Belgium 219.13 0.74 0.74 0 8 7 
Bermuda . . 0.95 . . . 
Bhutan 0.49 0.11 . 0 5 2 
Bolivia 8.04 0.48 0.53 0 1 1 
Botswana 5.68 0.16 0.90 0 7 7 
Brazil 638.12 0.32 0.43 0 6 3 
Bulgaria 13.96 0.25 0.67 0 10 8 
Cameroon 4.20 0.07 0.67 . 5 8 
Chile 72.26 0.55 0.48 0 7 4 
Colombia 95.21 0.29 0.39 0 8 5 
Costa Rica 16.31 0.24 0.65 0 2 5 
Croatia 21.81 0.40 0.61 0 1 6 
Cyprus 9.23 1.45 0.87 0 4 9 
Czech Republic 57.46 0.50 0.69 0 2 6 
Denmark 151.76 0.87 0.77 0 7 9 
Ecuador 16.85 0.29 0.76 . 1 3 
Egypt 91.82 . . 0 8 3 
El Salvador 13.09 0.40 0.79 0 5 5 
Estonia 5.80 0.31 0.89 0 8 6 
Fiji 1.54 0.33 . 0 3 7 
Finland 117.88 0.63 0.94 0 6 7 
France 1269.05 0.87 0.50 0 10 7 
Gabon 5.30 0.09 0.98 0 6 3 
Germany 1,838.42 1.09 0.61 0 5 7 
 Ghana 5.23 0.10 0.86 0 7 7 
Greece 123.73 0.40 0.87 0 1 3 
Grenada 0.37 0.67 . 0 4 8 
Guatemala 16.73 0.20 0.36 0 3 8 
Guyana 0.69 0.43 1.00 0 5 4 
Haiti 3.72 0.13 0.98 . 2 3 
Honduras 7.46 0.34 0.43 0 0 6 
Hong Kong 161.37 . . 0 10 10 
Hungary 47.82 0.31 0.64 0 2 7 
Iceland 9.25 1.26 1.00 0 5 7 
 India 448.97 0.27 0.36 0 7 8 
Indonesia 169.90 0.36 0.50 0 10 3 
Iran 108.49 . . . 5 4 
Iraq . . . . 4 3 
Israel 108.83 0.71 0.76 0 7 9 
Italy 1,080.36 0.69 0.54 0 7 3 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Country GDP Private credit Concentration Multiple superv. Extent disclosure Strength of legal 
  
 
to GDP 
 
authority index right 
Ivory Coast 10.04 . . . 6 3 
Jamaica 9.18 0.20 0.82 0 4 8 
Japan 4,691.42 1.49 0.36 0 7 7 
Jordan 8.56 0.68 0.88 0 5 4 
Kazakhstan 23.79 0.17 0.66 0 7 5 
Kenya 12.71 0.23 0.57 0 3 10 
Kuwait 39.81 0.42 0.68 0 7 4 
Kyrgyzstan 1.47 0.05 0.83 0 8 10 
Laos 1.96 0.07 0.96 . 0 4 
Latvia 8.68 0.27 0.53 0 5 9 
Lebanon 16.21 . 0.35 0 9 3 
Lesotho 0.78 0.13 1.00 0 2 7 
Lithuania 12.87 0.19 0.80 0 5 5 
Luxembourg 18.32 1.02 0.23 0 6 7 
Madagascar 3.90 0.09 0.79 . 5 2 
Malawi 1.68 0.05 0.89 0 4 8 
Malaysia 92.69 1.21 0.43 1 10 10 
Mali 3.00 0.14 0.81 0 6 3 
Malta 4.02 0.99 0.82 0 . . 
Mauritania 1.16 0.21 0.82 . 3 5 
Mauritius 4.48 0.56 0.81 0 6 5 
Mexico 586.99 0.19 0.63 0 8 4 
Morocco 39.36 0.40 0.63 0 6 3 
Mozambique 4.89 0.11 0.81 0 5 2 
Namibia 3.94 . 0.87 . 5 8 
Nepal 6.13 0.27 0.61 . 6 5 
Netherlands 365.51 1.24 0.72 1 4 6 
New Zealand 54.16 1.07 0.91 0 10 9 
Nicaragua 3.68 . 0.56 0 4 3 
Nigeria 52.68 0.12 0.46 1 5 8 
Norway 169.44 0.69 0.91 0 7 7 
Oman 18.88 0.34 0.71 0 8 4 
Pakistan 75.64 0.23 0.58 0 6 6 
Panama 11.07 0.76 0.35 0 1 6 
Paraguay 7.19 0.25 0.42 . 6 3 
Peru 51.84 0.19 0.67 0 8 7 
Philippines 74.59 0.35 0.76 0 2 3 
Poland 158.29 0.23 0.59 0 7 9 
Portugal 104.32 1.00 0.67 0 6 3 
Qatar 17.70 0.29 0.92 . 5 3 
Romania 42.60 0.11 0.70 0 9 8 
Rwanda 1.82 0.09 0.85 . 7 8 
Saudi Arabia 184.89 0.25 0.56 1 9 4 
Senegal 4.89 0.18 0.70 0 6 3 
Singapore 76.83 0.97 0.82 0 10 10 
Slovenia 19.10 0.32 0.64 0 3 6 
South Africa 129.79 0.62 0.87 0 8 9 
Spain 554.77 0.90 0.74 0 5 6 
Sri Lanka 16.13 0.25 0.70 0 4 4 
Sudan 13.72 0.04 0.67 . 0 5 
Swaziland 1.56 0.15 0.84 . 0 6 
Sweden 254.51 0.83 0.95 0 6 5 
Switzerland 245.55 1.59 0.84 0 0 8 
Syria 21.84 0.11 0.97 0 6 1 
Tanzania 11.05 0.05 0.60 0 3 8 
Thailand 126.97 1.11 0.49 0 10 4 
Togo 1.26 0.16 0.95 0 6 3 
Tonga 0.18 0.54 . . . . 
Tunisia 19.10 0.54 0.48 . 5 3 
Turkey 246.81 0.15 0.66 . 9 4 
Uganda 6.44 0.05 0.64 0 2 7 
Ukraine 39.50 . 0.55 . 5 9 
      
 
24 
 
       
Table 2 continued 
Country GDP Private credit Concentration Multiple superv. Extent disclosure Strength of legal 
  
 
to GDP 
 
authority index right 
United Kingdom 1,441.73 1.25 0.64 0 10 9 
Uruguay 21.47 0.46 0.51 0 3 5 
USA 10,235.14 0.52 0.25 1 7 8 
Uzbekistan 15.43 . 0.89 . 4 2 
Vanuatu 0.23 0.39 . 0 5 9 
Venezuela 119.84 . . 0 3 2 
Vietnam 34.02 0.40 0.83 . 6 8 
Zambia 3.54 0.06 0.67 . 3 9 
Zimbabwe 5.69 . 0.74 1 8 7 
Total Average 236.41 0.46 0.67 0.05 5.40 5.73 
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Table 3 
Summary Statistics for Bank-specific Variables 
This table presents summary statistics of bank-specific variables entered in the regressions. Panel A reports statistics for banks not 
involved in any deals. Panel B reports statistics for banks involved in domestic deals (the years before the deal). Panel C reports statistics 
for banks involved in cross border deals ((the years before the deal). Total Asset is the total amount of bank’s asset expressed in million 
of dollars. Return on Asset is the ratio between return and Asset. Net Interest Margin is the net interest income to earning assets. Other 
Operative Income to Total Income is the ratio between the sum of the non-traditional activity /net fees and commission, net trading 
income, net other income) and total operative income. Equity to Tot. Asset is the ratio between equity and total Asset. Cost to income is 
the ratio between total costs and total income. Liquid Assets to Deposit is the ratio between Liquidity and Deposits. Data are from 
Bankscope. 
 
 
Variable Obs Mean Median SD Minimum Maximum 
A. Banks not involved in M&As 
Total Asset 180,825 1,919.97 259.85 6,183.37 8,38 73,600.00 
Return on Asset 178,790 0.94 0.83 1.29 -5.72 10.25 
Net Interest Margin 175,899 3.75 3.65 1.91 0.01 16.44 
Other Op. Inc to Tot. Income 155,770 0.13 0.10 0.13 0.00 0.88 
Equity to Asset 180,680 11.25 8.75 10.69 1.28 88.61 
Cost to Income 174,737 67.31 66.04 19.62 15.46 205.30 
Liquid Asset to Deposits 164,386 19.11 11.90 20.07 0.42 125.86 
B. Banks involved in Domestic M&As 
Total Asset 1,141 5,207.48 941.63 11,400.00 9.42 73,300.00 
Return on Asset 1,133 0.61 0.59 1.35 -5.48 8.19 
Net Interest Margin 1,127 3.57 3.27 2.07 0.01 16.31 
Other Op. Inc to Tot. Income 963 0.12 0.08 0.12 0.00 0.85 
Equity to Asset 1,134 9.75 7.97 9.11 1.37 86.20 
Cost to Income 1,116 71.56 69.00 22.96 16.52 205.10 
Liquid Asset to Deposits 1,009 20.22 15.56 17.95 0.44 112.18 
C. Banks involved in Cross border M&As 
Total Asset 285 4,192.79 1,142.62 9,425.94 14.04 72,200.00 
Return on Asset 289 0.98 0.87 1.55 -5.69 6.21 
Net Interest Margin 281 4.30 3.71 2.93 0.09 16.29 
Other Op. Inc to Tot. Income 231 0.13 0.07 0.16 0.00 0.87 
Equity to Asset 293 10.86 9.01 8.48 1.58 66.11 
Cost to Income 278 68.60 65.87 25.74 17.57 202.12 
Liquid Asset to Deposits 233 23.92 19.53 19.19 0.72 97.10 
 
  
26 
 
Table 4 
Bank M&A targets: baseline specification 
The dependent variable takes the value of one if the bank is a target in an M&A, zero otherwise. The model is estimated using a 
probit specification. All independent variables are lagged one period. For variable definitions see the notes to Tables 1-3. Robust 
standard errors adjusted for in clustering at the bank level are reported in parentheses. The symbol *** indicates a significance 
level of 1 per cent or less; ** between 1 and 5 per cent; * between 5 and 10 per cent. Marginal effects are the partial change in the 
probability with respect to the change of each independent variables, evaluated at median. Values are multiplied by 10,0000.  
 
Binomial specification Multinomial specification 
 
 
Coefficients Marginal effects Coefficients Marginal effects  
   
Domestic Corss-border Domestic Corss-border Difference 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
    
 
  
 
   Panel A - Country characteristics    
        
GDP (log) -0.0219 -3.5240 0.0201 -0.1267** 2.3610 -0.1620 ** 
 (0.0323)  (0.0518) (0.0527)    
        
Private Credit /GDP -0.2873*** -46.1380 -0.3257** -0.6405*** -37.7640 -0.7660  
 (0.0782)  (0.1291) (0.1948)    
        
Bank Concentration -0.32066** -51.4890 -0.394* -0.1088 -45.7710 -0.0888  
 (0.1482)  (0.2345) (0.3049)    
        
Multiple sup. (dum.)  -0.29812* -70.2750 -0.3399 -1.3272*** -52.4130 -13.6440 ** 
 (0.1799)  (0.3038) (0.3578)    
        
Extent of disclosure  0.0063 1.0160 0.0143 0.0049 1.6710 0.0044  
 (0.0176)  (0.0287) (0.0275)    
        
Strength of legal rights  -0.0391* -6.2850 -0.0707* -0.0213 -8.2110 -0.0183  
 (0.0232)  (0.0387) (0.0243)    
        
   Panel B - Country averages    
        
Roa -0.0074 -1.1910 0.0162 -0.1049 1.8980 -0.1340  
 (0.0710)  (0.1218) (0.1153)    
        
Total assets (log)  0.2090*** 33.5690 0.3044*** 0.1671** 35.3490 0.1730  
 (0.0379)  (0.0513) (0.0714)    
        
Net interest margin  0.0362 5.8090 0.0647 -0.012 7.5280 -0.0230  
 (0.0336)  (0.0542) (0.0483)    
        
Equity / tot. Assets  0.0126 2.0190 0.0104 0.0256* 1.2090 0.0309  
 (0.0089)  (0.0147) (0.0142)    
        
Other op. / tot. Income 0.1120 17.9770 0.4573 -0.8418 53.2420 -1.1150 * 
 (0.5337)  (0.8973) (0.6238)    
        
Cost / income  0.0133*** 2.1480 0.0184** 0.0121* 2.1410 0.0131  
 (0.0049)  (0.0079) (0.0064)    
        
Liquid ass. / deposits  -0.0037 -0.5970 -0.0029 -0.0106*** -0.3460 -0.0131  
 (0.0027)  (0.0045) (0.0039)    
        
   Panel C - Bank characteristics    
        
Roa -0.0514* -8.2670 -0.1019** 0.0108 -11.8460 0.0260 * 
 (0.0303)  (0.0473) (0.0505)    
        
Total assets (log) 0.1238*** 19.8880 0.1681*** 0.1829*** 19.5150 0.2100  
 (0.0194)  (0.0286) (0.0393)    
        
Net interest margin 0.0133 2.1510 0.0229 0.0199 2.6650 0.0223  
 (0.0166)  (0.02686) (0.0239)    
        
Equity / tot. assets 0.0043 0.7050 0.0036 0.01049* 0.4220 0.0128  
 (0.0039)  (0.0065) (0.0062)    
        
Other op. / tot. income -0.6315** -101.4150 -0.811* -0.7219 -94.1390 -0.8090  
 (0.2979)  (0.4782) (0.574)    
        
Cost / income 0.0039*** 0.6310 0.0052*** 0.0042* 0.6120 0.0047  
 (0.0009)  (0.0013) (0.0022)    
        
Liquid ass. / deposits -0.0010 -0.1720 -0.0024 0.0018 -0.2800 0.0026  
 (0.0010)  (0.0017) (0.0028)    
        
        
Observations 136,183  136,183 136,183    
Predicted probabilità (x 1,000) 
 
 
5.63  5.77 0.04    
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Table 5 
Bank M&A targets: large banks 
The dependent variable takes the value of one if the bank is a target in an M&A, zero otherwise. The model is estimated using a 
probit specification. All independent variables are lagged one period. For variable definitions see the notes to Tables 1-3. Robust 
standard errors adjusted for in clustering at the bank level are reported parentheses. The symbol *** indicates a significance level 
of 1 per cent or less; ** between 1 and 5 per cent; * between 5 and 10 per cent. Marginal effects are the partial change in the 
probability with respect to the change of each independent variables, evaluated at median. Values are multiplied by 10,0000.  
 
Binomial specification Multinomial specification 
 
 
Coefficients Marginal effects Coefficients Marginal effects  
   
Domestic Corss-border Domestic Corss-border Difference 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
    
 
  
 
   Panel A - Country characteristics    
        
GDP (log) -0.0209 -3.3520 0.0583 -0.1343** 4.662 -0.0157 *** 
 (0.0359)  (0.0634) (0.0545)    
        
Private Credit /GDP -0.2869** -45.9410 -0.325 -0.5773** -25.939 -0.0606  
 (0.1146)  (0.2046) (0.2471)    
        
Bank Concentration -0.1630 -26.0940 0.0123 -0.0427 0.9830 -0.0049  
 (0.1808)  (0.2954) (0.3269)    
        
Multiple sup. (dum.)  -0.3722 -96.3320 -0.5931 -1.4209*** -83.8120 -2.2020 * 
 (0.2664)  (0.4656) (0.2925)    
        
Extent of disclosure  0.0187 3.0080 0.0192 0.0285 1.5350 0.0030  
 (0.0204)  (0.0335) (0.0369)    
        
Strength of legal rights  -0.0602** -9.6500 -0.0997** -0.0535 -7.9580 -0.0048  
 (0.0276)  (0.0466) (0.0321)    
        
   Panel B - Country averages    
        
Roa -0.0254 -4.0700 0.0555 -0.1942* 4.4340 -0.0223  
 (0.0833)  (0.1668) (0.115)    
        
Total assets (log)  0.1344** 21.5240 0.1866** 0.0648 14.8950 0.0051  
 (0.056)  (0.076) (0.0813)    
        
Net interest margin  0.0238 3.8130 0.0337 -0.01 2.6930 -0.0015  
 (0.0437)  (0.0751) (0.0573)    
        
Equity / tot. Assets  0.0097 1.5640 -0.0014 0.0255 -0.0120 0.0029  
 (0.0112)  (0.019) (0.017)    
        
Other op. / tot. Income 0.3709 59.3900 0.8941 -0.7235 71.3690 -0.0911 * 
 (0.6731)  (1.0936) (0.8628)    
        
Cost / income  0.0128** 2.0510 0.0175* 0.0119 1.3980 0.0011  
 (0.0058)  (0.0095) (0.0078)    
        
Liquid ass. / deposits  -0.0057 -0.9190 -0.0056 -0.0135*** -0.4510 -0.0014  
 (0.0035)  (0.0061) (0.0048)    
        
 -0.0247 -3.9650 -0.0675 0.005 -5.3930 0.0013  
 (0.0387)  (0.0591) (0.066)    
        
   Panel C - Bank characteristics    
        
Roa -0.0247 -3.9650 -0.0675 0.005 -5.3930 0.0013  
 (0.0387)  (0.0591) (0.066)    
        
Total assets (log) 0.1415*** 22.6650 0.1876*** 0.1398** 14.9750 0.0134  
 (0.0202)  (0.0334) (0.0565)    
        
Net interest margin -0.0070 -1.1310 -0.016 0.0062 -1.2840 0.0009  
 (0.0243)  (0.039) (0.0336)    
        
Equity / tot. assets 0.0015 0.2550 -0.0079 0.0169** -0.6320 0.0020 *** 
 (0.0052)  (0.0079) (0.0074)    
        
Other op. / tot. income -0.6929*** -110.9280 -1.0042*** -0.2334 -80.1480 -0.0144  
 (0.2599)  (0.3749) (0.6361)    
        
Cost / income 0.0012 0.2080 0.0008 0.0021 0.0654 0.0002  
 (0.0014)  (0.0026) (0.0032)    
        
Liquid ass. / deposits -0.0022*** -0.3540 -0.0044*** 0.0001 -0.3520 0.0001  
 (0.0008)  (0.0015) (0.0043)    
        
        
Observations 68,335  68,335 68,335    
Predicted probability (x 1,000) 
 
 
5.61  3.79 0.003    
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Table 6 
Bank M&A targets: G10 countries 
The dependent variable takes the value of one if the bank is a target in an domestic M&A, two if target in a cross border M&A, 
zero otherwise. The model is estimated using a multinomial probit specification. All independent variables are lagged one period. 
For variable definitions see the notes to Tables 1-3. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the country level are reported 
in parenthesis.  The symbol *** indicates a significance level of 1 per cent or less; ** between 1 and 5 per cent; * between 5 and 
10 per cent. Marginal effects are the partial change in the probability with respect to the change of each independent variables, 
evaluated at median. Values are multiplied by 10,0000. 
 
Binomial specification Multinomial specification 
 
 
Coefficients Marginal effects Coefficients Marginal effects  
   
Domestic Corss-border Domestic Corss-border Difference 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
    
 
  
 
   Panel A - Country characteristics    
        
GDP (log) -0.0348 -5.5050 -0.084 -0.3954 -5.2810 -0.6030  
 (0.2092)  (0.3038) (0.3072)    
        
Private Credit /GDP -0.0804 -12.7270 -0.1541 -0.2212 -9.7330 -0.3260  
 (0.1444)  (0.2165) (0.3132)    
        
Bank Concentration 0.1784 28.2230 -0.0811 0.3071 -5.1710 0.4850  
 (0.5277)  (0.787) (1.0987)    
        
Multiple sup. (dum.)  0.7478* 50.2690 0.7332 -0.2628 23.9970 -0.6980  
 (0.3956)  (0.6801) (0.37395)    
        
Extent of disclosure  0.1734** 27.4360 0.2444** -0.0814 15.4830 -0.1520 * 
 (0.0857)  (0.1155) (0.1087)    
        
Strength of legal rights  -0.2422*** -38.3150 -0.3115*** -0.0202 -19.7220 0.0022 ** 
 (0.0376)  (0.0426) (0.1074)    
        
   Panel B - Country averages    
        
Roa 0.2069 32.7280 0.1911 0.4016 12.0590 0.6010  
 (0.333)  (0.456) (0.446)    
        
Total assets (log)  0.1245*** 19.7070 0.1918*** -0.1085 12.1590 -0.1890 ** 
 (0.0377)  (0.0473) (0.1569)    
        
Net interest margin  -0.1593 -25.2010 -0.0219 -0.2531 -1.3630 -0.3900  
 (0.1177)  (0.1717) (0.3719)    
        
Equity / tot. Assets  -0.1464*** -23.1630 -0.2302*** -0.026 -14.5710 -0.0156 ** 
 (0.0561)  (0.0846) (0.0433)    
        
Other op. / tot. Income 3.5709* 564.7970 6.1452** -0.3137 389.0780 -1.1470  
 (1.9122)  (2.9755) (3.8963)    
        
Cost / income  0.026*** 4.1130 0.0342*** 0.0125 2.1650 0.0158  
 (0.0084)  (0.012) (0.0213)    
        
Liquid ass. / deposits  0.0134 2.0640 0.0197 0.0187* 1.2500 0.0270  
 (0.0111)  (0.0146) (0.011)    
        
   Panel C - Bank characteristics    
        
Roa -0.1094** -17.3060 -0.1683** -0.1287 -10.6450 -0.1810  
 (0.0538)  (0.0714) (0.1341)    
        
Total assets (log) 0.1092*** 17.2860 0.1494*** 0.1966*** 9.4380 0.2880  
 (0.0225)  (0.0491) (0.0587)    
        
Net interest margin 0.0013 0.2070 -0.034 0.0402 -2.1600 0.0659  
 (0.0376)  (0.0425) (0.0377)    
        
Equity / tot. assets 0.0008 0.1350 -0.0023 0.0183 -0.1500 0.0287  
 (0.008)  (0.0101) (0.0117)    
        
Other op. / tot. income -0.5819 -92.0440 -1.0268 0.4202 -65.0520 0.7610 * 
 (0.4594)  (0.7217) (0.5157)    
        
Cost / income 0.0027* 0.4280 0.0037** 0.0001 0.2400 -0.0005  
 (0.0014)  (0.0018) (0.0037)    
        
Liquid ass. / deposits -0.0009 -0.1500 -0.0035* 0.0045* -0.2240 0.0074 *** 
 (0.0014)  (0.0018) (0.0027)    
        
        
Observations 122,215  122,215 122,215    
Predicted probabilità (x 1,000) 
 
 
5.53  2.93 0.05    
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Table 7 
Bank M&A targets: non-G10 countries 
The dependent variable takes the value of one if the bank is a target in an domestic M&A, two if target in a cross border M&A, 
zero otherwise. The model is estimated using a multinomial probit specification. All independent variables are lagged one period. 
For variable definitions see the notes to Tables 1-3. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the country level are reported 
in parenthesis.  The symbol *** indicates a significance level of 1 per cent or less; ** between 1 and 5 per cent; * between 5 and 
10 per cent. Marginal effects are the partial change in the probability with respect to the change of each independent variables, 
evaluated at median. Values are multiplied by 10,0000.  
 
Binomial specification Multinomial specification 
 
 
Coefficients Marginal effects Coefficients Marginal effects  
   
Domestic Corss-border Domestic Corss-border Difference 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
    
 
  
 
   Panel A - Country characteristics    
        
GDP (log) -0.0055 -2.1940 0.0447 -0.0831 10.3410 -8.4840 * 
 (0.0431)  (0.0674) (0.0543)    
        
Private Credit /GDP -0.1353 -53.7630 -0.0843 -0.6389*** -13.7460 -62.0770 * 
 (0.1227)  (0.1889) (0.2363)    
        
Bank Concentration -0.4035* -160.3400 -0.4265 -0.4401 -89.6000 -40.1160  
 (0.2116)  (0.3258) (0.2766)    
        
Multiple sup. (dum.)  -0.4108** -106.0960      
 (0.1694)       
        
Extent of disclosure  -0.0158 -6.2860 -0.0423 0.0076 -9.2720 1.0570  
 (0.0198)  (0.0306) (0.0293)    
        
Strength of legal rights  0.0122 4.8660 0.0274 -0.0033 5.9880 -0.5240  
 (0.0214)  (0.0340) (0.0286)    
        
   Panel B - Country averages    
        
Roa -0.0594 -23.8430 -0.0721 -0.1252 -14.7890 -11.7740  
 (0.0648)  (0.103) (0.1134)    
        
Total assets (log)  0.1991*** 79.1230 0.2784*** 0.1519 59.4640 12.9090  
 (0.0621)  (0.1059) (0.0995)    
        
Net interest margin  0.0594* 23.6030 0.0904* -0.0086 19.7300 -1.4970 * 
 (0.0338)  (0.047) (0.0568)    
        
Equity / tot. Assets  0.0145 5.7750 0.01467 0.0216 3.0360 2.0220  
 (0.0097)  (0.0141) (0.0143)    
        
Other op. / tot. Income 0.1443 57.3390 0.2462 -1.0587* 61.1690 -105.6420 ** 
 (0.4471)  (0.6355) (0.6487)    
        
Cost / income  0.0062 2.4890 0.0058 0.01505** 1.1580 1.4350  
 (0.0043)  (0.005) (0.0066)    
        
Liquid ass. / deposits  -0.0088*** -3.5130 -0.0128*** -0.0142*** -2.6820 -1.3030  
 (0.0029)  (0.0046) (0.0045)    
        
   Panel C - Bank characteristics    
        
Roa 0.0025 1.0280 -0.0362 0.0519 -8.2620 5.3570  
 (0.0249)  (0.0380) (0.052)    
        
Total assets (log) 0.1181*** 46.9340 0.1581*** 0.1769*** 33.1290 16.2240  
 (0.0301)  (0.0530) (0.0413)    
        
Net interest margin 0.0399** 15.8690 0.0675*** 0.0094 14.6180 0.4460 ** 
 (0.0166)  (0.0254) (0.0276)    
        
Equity / tot. assets 0.0016 0.6540 0.0029 0.0032 0.6170 0.2960  
 (0.0037)  (0.0064) (0.0079)    
        
Other op. / tot. income -0.416** -165.2870 -0.0421 1.554** 2.0000 -152.1610 * 
 (0.1978)  (0.3160) (0.6527)    
        
Cost / income 0.0042** 1.6820 0.005** 0.0056* 1.0680 0.5160  
 (0.0016)  (0.0024) (0.003)    
        
Liquid ass. / deposits -0.0004 -0.1810 0.0004 -0.0039 0.1360 -0.3940  
 (0.0019)  (0.0027) (0.0037)    
        
        
Observations 13,968  14,525 14,525    
Predicted probabilità (x 1,000) 
 
 
15.86  11.61 4.62    
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Table 8 
Bank M&A targets: EU15 countries 
The dependent variable takes the value of one if the bank is a target in an domestic M&A, two if target in a cross border M&A, 
zero otherwise. The model is estimated using a multinomial probit specification. All independent variables are lagged one period. 
For variable definitions see the notes to Tables 1-3. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the country level are reported 
in parenthesis.  The symbol *** indicates a significance level of 1 per cent or less; ** between 1 and 5 per cent; * between 5 and 
10 per cent. Marginal effects are the partial change in the probability with respect to the change of each independent variables, 
evaluated at median. Values are multiplied by 10,0000. 
 
Binomial specification Multinomial specification 
 
 
Coefficients Marginal effects Coefficients Marginal effects  
   
Domestic Corss-border Domestic Corss-border Difference 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
    
 
  
 
   Panel A - Country characteristics    
        
GDP (log) -0.0858*** -1.1140 -0.1811*** 0.5257 -2.9920 1.2290 *** 
 (0.0293)  (0.0499) (0.0751)    
        
Private Credit /GDP -0.3581* -4.6490 1.4465 -0.7582 3.6380 -11.8460 *** 
 (0.2099)  (0.1535) (0.4031)    
        
Bank Concentration 0.3601 4.6750 0.9354 4.7708 2.0080 10.6380  
 (0.2954)  (0.3673) (0.5230)    
        
Multiple sup. (dum.)  0.3150 7.1540      
 (0.2143)       
        
Extent of disclosure  0.0359 0.4660 0.4736 -0.0964** 1.1470 -1.5180 *** 
 (0.0254)  (0.0396) (0.0342)    
        
Strength of legal rights  -0.089*** -1.1560 -0.1960*** -0.0414 -3.2020 -0.5860 *** 
 (0.0222)  (0.0291) (0.0438)    
        
   Panel B - Country averages    
        
Roa -0.1938 -2.5160 1.8306 -0.4740 4.4620 -7.4440  
 (0.1846)  (0.1976) (0.4539)    
        
Total assets (log)  0.0578 0.7510 0.1917* 0.3056 3.1310 0.6270 ** 
 (0.0492)  (0.0785) (0.0906)    
        
Net interest margin  0.0829 1.0770 0.2655* -0.3405** 4.4540 -5.3700 *** 
 (0.0685)  (0.1154) (0.1276)    
        
Equity / tot. Assets  -0.0016 -0.0213 -0.0796** 0.0973* -1.3340 1.5350 *** 
 (0.0297)  (0.0275) (0.0430)    
        
Other op. / tot. Income -0.3341 -4.3380 -0.1345 -3.7309* -1.1140 -57.9470 * 
 (1.2447)  -18735.0000 -15369.0000    
        
Cost / income  0.0068 0.0895 0.0271** -0.0070 0.4470 -0.1170 ** 
 (0.0053)  (0.0104) (0.0136)    
        
Liquid ass. / deposits  -0.0042* -0.0557 -0.0078 -0.0032 -0.1260 -0.0471  
 (0.0022)  (0.0047) (0.0053)    
        
   Panel C - Bank characteristics    
        
Roa -0.0137 -0.1780 -0.0461 -0.0361 -0.7460 -0.5480  
 (0.0322)  (0.0301) (0.1055)    
        
Total assets (log) 0.1562*** 2.0290 0.2577*** 0.2056*** 4.1660 3.1210  
 (0.013)  (0.0292) (0.0549)    
        
Net interest margin 0.0067 0.0871 0.2431 0.1236 0.5690 0.2670  
 (0.0377)  (0.0722) (0.0401)    
        
Equity / tot. assets 0.0112*** 0.1460 0.0165** 0.1201 0.2650 0.2650  
 (0.0041)  (0.0050) (0.0111)    
        
Other op. / tot. income -0.3945 -5.1220 -0.8156 -0.2903 -13.2880 -4.2730  
 (0.338)  (0.5880) (0.5954)    
        
Cost / income 0.0053*** 0.0693 0.0074*** 0.0038 0.1200 0.0563 * 
 (0.0012)  (0.0017) (0.0023)    
        
Liquid ass. / deposits -0.0032*** -0.0418 -0.0053* 0.0008 -0.0869 0.0140  
 (0.0009)  (0.0021) (0.0028)    
        
        
Observations 35,676  35,676 35,676    
Predicted probabilità (x 1,000) 
 
 (x 1,000) 
1.83  0.66 0.62    
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Table 9 
Bank M&A targets: EMU countries 
The dependent variable takes the value of one if the bank is a target in an domestic M&A, two if target in a cross border M&A, 
zero otherwise. The model is estimated using a multinomial probit specification. All independent variables are lagged one period. 
For variable definitions see the notes to Tables 1-3. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the country level are reported 
in parenthesis.  The symbol *** indicates a significance level of 1 per cent or less; ** between 1 and 5 per cent; * between 5 and 
10 per cent. Marginal effects are the partial change in the probability with respect to the change of each independent variables, 
evaluated at median. Values are multiplied by 10,0000.  
 
Binomial specification Multinomial specification 
 
 
Coefficients Marginal effects Coefficients Marginal effects  
   
Domestic Corss-border Domestic Corss-border Difference 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
    
 
  
 
   Panel A - Country characteristics    
        
GDP (log) 0.1820 15.0320 0.7069 0.5731** 3.6870 42.1630 ** 
 (0.1180)  (0.1584) (0.2011)    
        
Private Credit /GDP -1.6380** -135.2660 -0.5168 -4.7054*** -15.2810 -346.7790 *** 
 (0.5605)  (0.7733) (0.9980)    
        
Bank Concentration 0.1570 12.9610 -0.7269 2.6729*** -39.2480 198.9340 *** 
 (0.4539)  (0.8259) (0.4094)    
        
Multiple sup. (dum.)         
        
        
Extent of disclosure  -0.0425 -3.5060 0.2896 -0.0209 1.9970 -1.6230  
 (0.0371)  (0.0282) (0.0782)    
        
Strength of legal rights  -0.0622 -5.1350 0.1090 -0.1760 1.0730 -13.0360  
 (0.0437)  (0.1306) (0.1039)    
        
   Panel B - Country averages    
        
Roa -0.1678 -13.855 4.5563 -0.5831 31.9300 -44.3500 * 
 (0.3330)  (0.5077) (0.3562)    
        
Total assets (log)  -0.0732 -6.0430 -0.1715 -1.2554*** -5.6560 -92.4580 ** 
 (0.1682)  (0.3889) (0.2860)    
        
Net interest margin  -0.4107 -33.9130 -0.0364 -2.0636*** 2.2340 -152.4480 *** 
 (0.3006)  (0.3158) (0.4694)    
        
Equity / tot. Assets  0.0219 1.8080 -0.0121 -0.0347 -0.5020 -2.5430  
 (0.0383)  (0.0354) (0.0658)    
        
Other op. / tot. Income -3.5357 -291.9890 -9.8521** -14.3562** -435.3050 -1042.2120  
 (2.2299)  -34927.0000 -54281.0000    
        
Cost / income  -0.0071 -0.5870 0.1090 -0.1250*** 0.9750 -9.2700 *** 
 (0.0156)  (0.0229) (0.0265)    
        
Liquid ass. / deposits  0.0029 0.2390 0.0096** -0.0135* 0.4740 -1.0120 *** 
 (0.0016)  (0.0036) (0.0069)    
        
   Panel C - Bank characteristics    
        
Roa -0.0029 -0.2410 -0.0559 -0.0002 -2.6270 0.0942  
 (0.0466)  (0.0547) (0.1445)    
        
Total assets (log) 0.1564*** 12.9200 0.2728*** 0.2683*** 12.3020 19.3070  
 (0.0220)  (0.0385) (0.0608)    
        
Net interest margin 0.0188 1.5490 0.1076 -0.0028 0.7320 -0.2360  
 (0.0366)  (0.0677) (0.0611)    
        
Equity / tot. assets 0.0133* 1.0980 0.0201* 0.1528 0.9000 1.5880  
 (0.0056)  (0.0079) (0.0136)    
        
Other op. / tot. income -0.8007 -66.1240 -1.5303* -0.0264 -71.8280 0.9720 *** 
 (0.5347)  (0.6352) (0.8806)    
        
Cost / income 0.0053** 0.4390 0.0060 0.0056* 0.2700 0.4030  
 (0.0019)  (0.0037) (0.0028)    
        
Liquid ass. / deposits -0.0024 -0.1980 -0.0051** 0.0002 -0.2400 0.0212 * 
 (0.0014) 
 
(0.0019) (0.0042) 
  
 
        
        
Observations 21,269  21,412 21,412    
Predicted probability 
 
 
2.68  2.07 3.44    
       
 
 
